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1Negotiating Justice
South Sudan’s courts have continued to function 
despite the extreme pressures of civil war, atrocities, 
and economic crisis. They constitute a resilient form of 
civil authority and an instrument to deal with everyday 
criminality. The courts also hold the potential to prevent 
violence and improve protection, not least because 
both men and women turn to the courts to resolve 
all manner of disputes, from minor arguments within 
families to violent disputes and abuses, including by 
local authorities. People also publicly show compliance 
during court proceedings, despite uncertainty over when 
and how judgements will be implemented. However, 
all are not equal under the law in South Sudan. Instead 
justice reproduces social and economic inequalities, 
and is subject to local improvisations. Court decisions 
are sometimes complicit in human rights violations, 
especially of women and youth. And military, political 
and economic elites have opportunities to circumvent  
or manipulate the system. 
The justice system is defined by legal and judicial 
plurality, comprising a patchwork of statutory law and 
more than 60 varieties of customary law administered 
either by judges or chiefs. It is not easily legible as an 
abstract code from the outside, but recording of specific 
cases reveals how the law is applied. We find some cases 
that exemplify fairness or good practice, as well as many 
that reinforce discrimination and inequalities. This paper 
is based on findings from more than 600 observations 
of customary and statutory courts by twenty South 
Sudanese researchers for the Justice and Security 
Research Programme (JSRP) from July 2015-July 20161.
It identifies key issues for further deliberation based on 
research in the towns of Nimule, Torit, Rumbek, Yambio, 
Yei, Wau, and surrounding areas, in Juba town and 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Protection of 
Civilian Sites (UNMISS PoCs) in Juba and Bentiu. It builds 
on previous analyses that emphasised the importance 
of chiefs’ courts as a locus of civil authority engaged 
in making order, and an entry point for initiatives to 
promote and protect the rights of the vulnerable (de 
Waal and Ibreck, 2016).
Notably, the courts are situated within a fragmented justice 
and security landscape in the context of war, structural 
violence and corruption (de Waal, 2014). This paper 
examines only one facet of justice – court practices and 
judgements – we do not review how cases come to court, 
whether and how decisions were implemented, or wider 
abuses within the justice and security system. We simply 
focus on the range of cases heard in court, and how judges 
exercise their legal and normative authority during the 
proceedings. It should be noted that the courts cannot 
necessarily compel people to attend nor can they ensure 
that their decisions are enforced, since some cases are  
not reported to the police, and security forces and other 
local authorities sometimes lack the capacity or the will  
to promote adherence to the law. 
The research reveals the makeshift characteristics 
of courts, and the influence of local contexts and 
participants on the prospects for justice. We find there 
are clear distinctions between statutory and customary 
courts in terms of their procedures and composition, yet 
they also overlap and blend, with the former drawing 
upon customary precedents, while the latter sometimes 
take statutory law into account in their decisions. 
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Moreover, all the courts are under-resourced, often 
relying on commitment and goodwill. Chiefs, lawyers 
and paralegals are either inadequately paid or voluntary. 
Even judges are subject to delays in salary and poor 
working conditions.2 The possibilities for good decisions 
thus depend upon local conditions and interventions, 
including the conduct of individuals. Given the wider 
conditions of conflict and fragmentation, it is also 
apparent that the local characteristics of courts are  
often the basis of their legitimacy and trust. 
The failings of the security forces, and attempts by 
powerful actors to exploit the courts for personal or 
political advantage, are everyday concerns for those 
working to improve the justice system.3 Given political 
uncertainty and insecurity, compliance with the courts 
partly depends on the parties concerned and pressure from 
within the local community. Nevertheless, court hearings 
are pivotal for the establishment and administration of 
law, and in promoting norms including human rights. 
Customary courts have long been the mainstay of the 
justice system and remain so today. They are accessible 
and prolific, dispensing frequent and swift judgements, 
with cases often reaching the courts in a matter of days 
and being decided rapidly. They have been uniquely 
responsive and adaptable during the current conflict.  
The decisions taken by these courts, especially those 
relating to marital and sexual relationships, frequently 
violate international human rights norms – although in 
some cases, there are efforts to uphold these rights.  
Yet the open public deliberation characteristic of 
customary courts ensures that they are more than just a 
forum for dispensing decisions on breaches of the law 
and infractions of custom. Rather, customary justice is a 
mechanism for making social order, constituting public 
authority and shared identities and norms. Customary 
chiefs and their courts are closely engaged with 
protection issues and their activities are closely relevant to 
the questions of how to prevent and transform conflict. 
2.  Many of their grievances were expressed in a strike in June 2016 
(Radio Tamazuj, 22 June 2016).
3.  For instance, such concerns were expressed during JSRP civil 
society forums in Juba, July 2016. 
The significance of customary courts reflects some 
continuity with the situation prior to the outbreak of 
civil war in December 2013, and with governance in 
South Sudan over a longer period, especially since 
the creation of the Government of Southern Sudan 
in 2005. Remarkably, in some areas, the war has 
apparently strengthened chiefs’ roles in provision of 
regulation and order as statutory courts and formal 
government institutions run out of funds and legitimacy. 
Chiefs and their courts are found across South Sudan, 
in government and opposition areas, when other 
governance institutions appear to be in flux. In periods of 
conflict and flight to new settlements, South Sudanese 
have repeatedly remade customary courts in pursuit of 
social order and public authority. For instance, customary 
courts have emerged with significant authority in UN 
PoC sites (Ibreck and Pendle, 2016). 
Many statutory courts have ceased to function in conflict 
zones or during periods of fighting, yet they continued to 
operate in the towns observed for most of the research 
period. In general, the courts are convened and presided 
over by a single judge who ideally ‘wears three hats’ as 
judge and advocate for each of the parties.4 There are 
some examples that demonstrate good practice – most 
judges refer to legal codes in their decisions; some 
show compassion and moral concern in their decisions; 
and many cases come to trial rapidly after the alleged 
offence. Yet, the system is a lottery: it is marred by 
irregularities and cannot protect the rights of defendants 
or complainants. Moreover, statutory courts frequently 
rely on customary norms and practices, for instance with 
the award of compensation in murder cases. 
In what follows, we present evidence from the JSRP 
archive on the current practices of customary and 
statutory courts. We identify a series of issues that are 
crucial for understanding the significance of the courts 
and the prospects for justice, contributing to a body of 
existing knowledge about the courts in South Sudan 
(inter alia Jok et al., 2004; Deng, 2010; Deng, 2013; 
4.  This phrase was used by Justice Raimondo Geri to sum up his 
task (court observer forum, Juba, July 2016). It is substantiated 
by the evidence from the cases that legal representation is rare, 
so judges must ‘guide the accused to explain his case properly; 
help the prosecution and pronounce the verdict’. 
Leonardi et al., 2010; Mennen, 2010). We include cases 
that reflect general patterns, expose abuses or indicate 
the prospects for reform. The aim is to highlight cases 
that South Sudanese judges, chiefs, legal practitioners 
and activists might find useful to consider in reviewing 
and improving the system. Our findings also shed light 
on the state of the justice system during a period of 
conflict, political uncertainty, and economic crisis. 
Reviewing customary and 
statutory court cases
To assess how the courts are functioning in practice, 
we identified a series of concerns relating to justice in 
South Sudan, based on previous studies (e.g. Leonardi et 
al., 2010), and interviews or dialogues about the justice 
system (including JSRP forums in 2014-16). We then 
posed these as questions to identify patterns and salient 
cases in the JSRP archive. The records are anonymised 
for ethical reasons, but the circumstances, charges, 
judgements and locations are identified. The discussion 
below synthesises our conclusions regarding the 
tendencies of statutory and customary courts, and their 
performance during the conflict. Through specific cases, 
we also reveal a host of complex issues that confront 
South Sudanese judicial and legal practitioners.
Do courts promote civil authority? 
The courts do generally uphold norms of civility in the 
process and occasionally they make important rulings 
against military or political authorities (also see Ibreck 
and Pendle, 2016: 30-33). Looking across a diverse range 
of cases, we find that the public authority of customary 
courts has been resilient in each of the localities studied 
in 2015-16,5 despite the flux of political leadership and 
the uncertainties of war. It is also apparent that statutory 
courts have continued to take and settle cases routinely. 
The court observations highlight the different procedures 
and composition of customary and statutory courts and 
some similarities between them in how compliance and 
legitimacy are generated. Certainly, all judicial authorities 
are nominally underpinned by the legal authority of 
5.  These included the towns of Torit, Nimule, Rumbek, Juba,  
Yei and Wau, and surrounding areas at boma, payam or  
county levels. 
the state. Statutory courts are also symbols of the 
state and are often supported by other officials, such 
as court police. But the courts also depend upon local 
compliance, especially in the context of civil war and 
contested governmental authority. This makes judicial 
authorities vulnerable to local pressures and power 
relations and occasional forms of resistance. Yet the 
dependence of the courts on local compliance, and their 
capacity to generate consent, also enables a continuity 
of public authority even when governmental power is 
unpredictable and changing.
Pursuing civil processes 
The strength of customary systems as civil forms of 
order-making relies upon the public and participatory 
nature of the process. The court panels generally 
include several chiefs – the number varies depending 
on the locality and timing – and sometimes women’s 
representatives are included. They consistently engage 
in moralising on questions of right and wrong and 
involve deliberation and questioning. Customary chiefs 
rely on weighing up the statements of the two parties, 
and some contributions from witnesses; occasionally 
they take account of or demand documentary evidence. 
Decisions are usually justified by reference to local 
‘customary’ norms, but some chiefs cite statutory 
legislation as the basis for their decisions. Elements of 
negotiation and arbitration are central to customary 
practice, but chiefs may also act in inquisitorial roles  
akin to those of the judges in statutory courts. 
Customary court hearings are generally held in the open, 
and people contribute to their deliberations. This publicity 
increases local accountability, but it also makes decisions 
susceptible to popular sentiment and prevailing local 
power hierarchies. Chiefs and participants’ discussions 
and decisions can reinforce inequalities and differences 
that serve the interests of violent entrepreneurs (see 
below). Yet the courts tend to reach settlements quite 
rapidly and the crowd present often seems to accept the 
judgement as fair, only rarely raising complaints.
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There are three levels of customary courts, with  
A courts at Boma level, B courts at Payam level and  
C courts at county level, while urban areas may also  
have town bench courts. On paper, A courts are 
expected to rule on family matters and minor disputes; 
B courts to take more serious civil cases that merit fines 
or prison sentences; and C courts to act on appeals 
and handle some criminal cases (Mertenskoetter and 
Luak, 2012). The reality is fuzzier, with diversity in 
cases handled at different levels (see various examples 
below). The jurisdictions, composition and procedures 
of courts vary in different localities, as does the  
content of ‘customary law’, as illustrated in the 
following two cases. 
DISPUTE OVER AN ‘INFORMAL’ 
CONTRACT IN TORIT  
A customary C court hearing in Torit on 24 May 
2016, was presided over by a single chief, a 
secretary and two court police; it was attended 
by 13 women and 33 men. The case concerned 
a dispute over an ‘unwritten contract’.  
The presiding chief first noted the name, 
address, tribe, occupation and relations of both 
the complainant and accused. He then asked 
the complainant to explain what brought him 
to court. The complainant claimed that the 
accused had not fulfilled the terms of their 
agreement to pay 1500 SSP, and he brought 
a witness to support his claim. The accused 
argued that he was lying about the contract, 
in which he had only agreed to pay 750 SSP. 
Neither could produce any documentary 
evidence. The accused was then given a  
chance to state his case. 
The complainant alleged that the accused 
had initially refused to appear in court and 
that when he received the summons from 
the customary court the accused had thrown 
it before the sender stating ‘what will these 
chiefs do... do you know who I am?’ This second 
allegation was also taken seriously by the 
court. The chief questioned the accused on this 
matter: ‘why have you acted like that? You have 
thrown the court petition and you know this 
is a criminal offence under South Sudan Penal 
Code Article 110.’ The chief determined that the 
accused had shown disrespect to the rule of law 
and must be punished for it. He ruled in favour 
of the complainant and imposed a fine of 2500 
SSP. The accused agreed to pay the amount, but 
‘seemed confused.’
A LAND DISPUTE IN WAU NORTH
The resolution of a land dispute in a customary 
A court in Hai Bafra, Wau North, highlights a 
more reconciliatory approach. This case, held 
on 18 March 2016, was adjudicated by a chief, 
an assistant chief and a court secretary was also 
on the panel taking notes (there were no court 
police); it was attended by five women and six 
men. The complainant told of a long running 
inter-familial dispute relating to a plot of land. 
He alleged that when he had come to the area 
from Khartoum he had been invited to stay by 
the grandmother of the accused and bought a 
plot from them for 300 SSP in 2007, but there 
were no official documents. He claimed that 
he began to fight with the accused after he 
discovered he had beaten his daughter, and at 
that point the accused questioned his right to 
stay on the land. The family of the accused then 
went to the Ministry of Infrastructure to check 
the registration of the plot and found that 
since the land was demarcated the situation 
had become more complex. The complainant’s 
plot was still registered to the accused while 
the accused’s plot was registered in another 
name (unrelated to them). 
The chief and his panel court members asked 
many relevant questions. They then asked both 
parties to speak about what would help them 
most. The complainant asked the accused’s 
family, who were all present in the court, 
whether they would allow him to remain on 
the plot, or whether he should sell it and take 
off the discount he paid to their grandmother. 
Another option discussed was whether to go to 
the authorities to change the names of the two 
plots to their names. Finally, the accused and 
his family agreed ‘to step down from’ the plot 
where the complainant was staying. 
In both these customary cases, the matter raised was 
resolved within around an hour and at a fee of 30 
SSP.6 In contrast, statutory trials are less transparent 
and participatory and cases take longer to resolve, 
cases are frequently adjourned and further evidence is 
called for. Most of those present in these courts tend 
to be involved as parties or witnesses in the case, or 
awaiting trial later in the day. Very rarely is a lawyer 
present to represent one of the parties and there is no 
jury. The courts use different languages depending on 
the locality, but parties may not be familiar with the 
language or procedures of the court. Although, parties 
are typically reminded of their rights to representation, 
they must generally speak for themselves and tend to 
present their case in the same manner they would in a 
customary court. Judges reach their conclusions swiftly 
and independently, either to settle or defer the matter; 
they often make references to better-known laws, such 
as the Penal Code, 2008, to justify their decisions.  
The system is nominally common law, but proceeds 
largely without reference to precedent, and without 
publication of case decisions. In practice, therefore, the 
courts tend to cultivate legitimacy through direct or 
implicit reference to customary norms, as the main  
form of precedent familiar to South Sudanese, as 
illustrated in the case below. 
6.  Note that later cases illustrate the variation in the cost of courts, 
depending on the locality. Court fees may rise to as much as  
150 SSP. 
A FAMILY DISPUTE IN JUBA
A family dispute brought to the statutory 
court in Juba Kator Payam on 21 December 
2015 highlights similarities with the customary 
approach. The case was heard by one male 
judge with 13 people in attendance, and 
was resolved through mediation. The first 
wife in a polygamous marriage alleged that 
her husband’s second wife was subjecting 
her to verbal and physical abuse. The case 
was brought by the sister of the first wife 
who explained that she believed that the 
abuse was directed at her sister because she 
is from the Dinka ethnic group. The first wife 
attested to the sister’s claims stating: ‘They 
politicise the problem’. The judge chose not 
to impose punitive measures and instead took 
a ‘counselling approach’ to work towards 
reconciling the two parties. 
In justifying his actions, the judge stated that 
the ‘conflict had taken a tribal dimension and 
imposing fines would worsen the relationship 
of the two parties.’ He stated that as the two 
parties were related by marriage, tribalism 
should be avoided particularly as there 
were already children involved ‘sharing 
the blood of the two ethnic groups.’ He 
asked the complainant to drop the case and 
reconcile with the accused. He also asked the 
sympathisers of each party to reconcile.  
After a long arbitration by the judge, the 
women compromised and reconciled with  
one another without any charges.
The judge stated that the 
‘conflict had taken a tribal 
dimension and imposing fines 
would worsen the relationship 
of the two parties.’ 
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Imposing civil authority
Occasionally, the courts deal with cases involving 
government officials, chiefs, or members of the security 
forces responsible for violence or criminal actions.  
The flexibility in the justice system creates openings for 
powerful actors in breach of the law to manipulate and 
evade justice. Yet it is notable that people still bring cases 
in the hope that they will succeed. Furthermore, some 
cases demonstrate the possibility for accountability. 
A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN ARMY 
OFFICER IN A LAND DISPUTE IN JUBA 
A land case held in Gudele High Court in Juba is 
typical of the problem that judicial authorities 
face in bringing military actors to account. It 
illustrates the limits of the authority of the 
courts and the voluntary compliance needed for 
a case to take place. On 22 February 2016, a land 
case was heard by one male judge with fifteen 
people in attendance. The matter concerned the 
conduct of an army officer accused of taking 
a plot of land belonging to a Bari woman 
who had built a tukul (traditional house) on 
it and lived there since 2008. The complainant 
explained that she was initially assured of her 
rights by the county commissioner and local 
committee. But the army officer had threatened 
them, using force to claim the land. He then 
sought to purchase documents to register the 
plot in his name. The complainant did not report 
the matter to the police and instead brought the 
issue directly to court with the aim of reclaiming 
her property. She was asked to pay 2000 SSP 
alongside the court fees for bringing the case to 
court (the reason for the payment was unclear). 
However, the accused officer simply failed to 
attend on the date of the hearing. The court 
remained in session for five hours, presumably 
awaiting the officer’s arrival, but his absence 
left the court powerless to rule on the matter. 
The complainant spoke of her frustration at 
the ‘the way people with guns threaten those  
without guns’ and the officer’s ability to take 
the land ‘because he is a man with money 
and a gun.’ This case suggests that the courts 
cannot challenge the power and authority 
of military actors, although the fact that the 
complainant raised the case in court indicates 
her hope that the civil forum might hold sway. 
A CASE AGAINST A SOLDIER WHO FAILED 
TO PAY A DEBT IN RUMBEK
In some cases, it does seem possible to 
bring military actors to court and to secure 
a prosecution. In customary proceedings at 
Rumbek town court, on 20 October 2015, a 
female seller of local brew raised a case against 
a Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) soldier 
who was accused of consuming her alcohol on 
credit. He ran up a debt of 200 SSP and failed 
to pay it back. The woman explained that she 
had gone to his duty station to request the 
money owed, knowing that he had been paid, 
yet the soldier still refused to pay her and 
instead gave his pay directly to his wife.  
The complainant then decided to follow the 
matter up at his house. When she confronted 
him there, the soldier threatened to beat her. 
The soldier attended the court case and 
responded to the demands of the court for an 
explanation. He conceded that he did owe the 
woman a debt of 200 SSP but explained that he 
was still unable to pay. He claimed that his salary 
was not in fact given to his wife but instead was 
taken by another individual from whom he had 
previously taken a loan. The court ruled that 
the soldier must immediately pay the amount 
of 200 SSP plus losses incurred amounting to 
600 SSP and should be detained until he clears 
that debt. He was also ordered to pay the losses 
incurred by the woman. The judgement was 
welcomed by the complainant and supported by 
the onlookers. 
A PROSECUTION OF A SOLDIER FOR 
RAPE IN WAU
A particularly significant prosecution of an SPLA 
soldier for the rape of a child was made by Wau 
customary A court on 16 July 2015. The soldier 
was accused of statutory rape of a six-year-old 
child. The judge found the soldier guilty based 
on the evidence presented and sentenced the 
soldier to 14 years’ imprisonment and five cows 
to be paid in compensation to the family of 
the child. The imprisonment period is in line 
with the Penal Code 2008 and the Child Act 
2008. However, under statutory law, rape cases 
should only be tried by statutory courts. Yet, at 
the time, there did not appear to be a statutory 
court functioning in Wau and so the case might 
have only been heard in the customary court 
because of lack of access to an alternative.  
Do courts regulate violence  
and criminality? 
Both customary and statutory courts repeatedly 
demonstrate their capacity to prosecute perpetrators of 
violence. In this sense, they surely contribute to conflict 
prevention by limiting demands for self-help justice  
and revenge. Courts often also engage in pre-emptive 
efforts to regulate violence and criminality, although  
it is not always clear whether these are successful.  
Court sentences typically either involved fines or 
imprisonment or some form of reparation, whether 
livestock or monetary compensation.
TWO CASES OF CATTLE RAIDING  
IN RUMBEK
A customary case held in Rumbek on  
24 November 2015 responded to an ongoing 
local conflict involving cycles of cattle raids, 
in which cattle were stolen by one clan and 
counter raids organised. The case was presided 
over by a panel of four chiefs who ruled that 
all stolen cattle be returned to the rightful 
owners and warned both the complainant and 
the accused that ‘the law does not permit the 
raiding of cattle as a revenge for your stolen 
cows.’ This case is significant firstly as cattle 
raiding can often turn violent and spark cycles 
of revenge killing, alongside raiding of cattle, 
and secondly as the court provides a resolution 
outside of continuing cycles of raids (which 
would have likely been the case without this 
judgement).
Charges of cattle raiding were presented at 
a statutory court in Rumbek on 6 January 
2016. The complainant accused a man of 
stealing his cattle and requested that the 
court take steps to recover his cattle from the 
accused. The accused appealed explaining 
that since the raid he had been reprimanded 
by the police who had taken six of the cattle 
and further he accused the complainant of 
‘collaborating with the military and selling 
one of his bulls which is now counted against 
him.’ The complainant denied having taken 
part in selling the bull but stated that it is 
‘a tradition of the police and security when 
they catch a thief to take some of his cows or 
money as a penalty for the crime’ – he argued 
that this should not be counted against him 
as he ‘didn’t give the orders.’ The case was 
adjourned to bring witnesses forward and a 
statement from the military and police was 
requested. This shows the challenges involved 
in resolving such cases, but also establishes 
the willingness of the courts to investigate a 
complaint against the police. 
The chiefs warned both the 
complainant and the accused 
that ‘the law does not permit 
the raiding of cattle as a 
revenge for your stolen cows.’ 
8 9
THE PUNISHMENT OF A VIOLENT 
PERPETRATOR IN NIMULE
The possibility for bringing a violent 
perpetrator to justice was demonstrated in an 
exemplary ruling in Nimule county court on  
16 September 2015. The case took only ten days 
to be taken to court through the police with a 
recommendation from the public prosecutor. 
The complainant accused her husband’s cousin 
of beating her. She explained that he became 
violent when she did not respond immediately 
to his instruction to come to his house, and 
accused her of undermining his authority 
within his household, so that ‘his wife does not 
respect him as usual.’ When she arrived at his 
house, he dragged her into a room and beat 
her with a stick. She was injured on her neck, 
arm and thigh and showed physical and written 
evidence of these in ‘form 8’ (a form issued 
by the police). She also showed evidence of 
expenses incurred during her treatment. 
The facts of the case were not disputed by 
either the perpetrator or the witness. Yet the 
accused defended his actions on the basis 
that he was responsible for looking after the 
woman because her husband is a driver and 
is often away. He also admitted that he beat 
his own wife and took the telephones of both 
his wife and the complainant explaining: ‘The 
reason why I beat her is that she and my wife 
do come home very late. They are all business 
women but they report home normally at 
9:00pm… they do not listen to my advice.’ 
The judge issued a punishment for the assault, 
citing the South Sudan Penal Code 2008. Article 
9, section 233. The accused was fined 600 SSP, he 
was to pay the treatment bill of 300 SSP, pay for 
the telephone if any damage was found on it or 
an equivalent amount of 840 SSP and pay for the 
goods which got spoiled in the store while the 
complainant was in treatment. The judgement 
was welcomed by the complainant. She said ‘let 
the law take its course because women are tired 
of torture from the men of such nature.’
Do courts license and tolerate violence?
The case records suggest that courts do not generally 
license violence, but they frequently tolerate it, especially 
in cases relating to gender-based violence (see below). 
Some customary courts issued sentences of corporal 
punishment, including ‘lashes’ and ‘canes’. In such 
rulings, judges generally allowed people to pay a fine as 
an alternative, favouring those with access to money. 
Statutory courts in South Sudan are also prepared to 
award the death penalty, even when the defendant is 
not represented by a lawyer.
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN JUBA POC
A court in the Juba PoC imposed a sentence 
of corporal punishment on 14 January 2016. 
The sentence was imposed upon a woman 
convicted of arranging to have a child moved 
out of the PoC without the father’s consent. 
She was sentenced to a ‘beating’, with the 
support of the crowd. Similarly, two adultery 
cases held in Juba customary courts led to the 
accused parties (one male, one female) being 
subjected to caning as well as fines. 
DEATH PENALTY ISSUED IN RUMBEK
A highly sensitive case concerning a violent 
feud between clans, was heard in Rumbek 
statutory court on 25 September 2015. The case 
appeared to be a straightforward murder case 
– the motivation for murder was said to be the 
theft of a large amount of money from the 
deceased. But although the accused admitted 
the crime, he claimed that it was in revenge for 
his cousin’s murder by the clan of the deceased. 
He explained that there were ongoing revenge 
killings among warring communities in the 
state and argued that he should be put on  
trial together with others involved in this  
feud, including the murderer of his cousin,  
who he alleged was killed by the family of  
the complainant in his case. 
The judge sentenced the accused to death 
with 14 days to appeal. The accused declared 
he would appeal on grounds that a clan war 
is the responsibility of both communities, not 
a lone individual. Indeed, the case demands 
further scrutiny. Firstly, the ruling is in 
violation of international human rights law 
due to the death sentence and lack of due 
process: the accused was not represented by a 
lawyer. Secondly, previous cases suggest that 
restrictions on implementation of the death 
penalty – which can only be issued to persons 
aged over 18 and must be signed by the 
President – are not always adhered to.  
Thirdly, given the context of clan feuds, the 
ruling has the potential to inflame local 
tensions and be counted as just another killing 
in the clans’ cycles of revenge.7 Additionally, 
the ruling is in contrast with the sentences  
of compensation awarded in several other 
murder cases (see below).  
Courts also ignore or tolerate violence in various forms. 
For instance, there are cases in which grievous bodily 
harm (‘beating’) is reported during the trial, but because 
the harm was not the original subject of the complaint, 
it is not commented on or punished by the court. 
This approach does not appear to contradict popular 
sentiment, based on observations of the audience, 
but it entrenches the legal and social permissibility of 
violence, and leaves victims, who are generally the most 
marginalised, with no means of redress. 
7.  For example, in 2013 there was a series of killings in Rumbek 
in revenge for two men executed by the SPLA government in 
the 1990s. Yet it should be noted that communities have also 
sometimes demanded the death penalty in such circumstances 
arguing that it is a means to end the violence (personal 
communication, Non-Violent Peace Force representative in 
Mingkaman, 2016), which may be a source of pressure on 
judges in such cases. 
ACCUSATION OF VIOLENCE IGNORED  
IN A CASE IN JUBA POC 
A case held in the Juba PoC on 5 May 2016 
presided over by 13 chiefs describes the 
complainant openly beating the accused in 
public with a weapon. However, the case was 
brought to resolve an incident of trespassing 
and the question of violence against the 
accused was not pursued by the court. No 
punitive measures were taken against the 
complainant, despite his admission of having 
committed the beating. In taking no measures, 
and failing to condemn the beating, the court 
contributed to tolerance of societal violence.
WOMAN LEFT VULNERABLE AFTER A 
DIVORCE CASE IN RUMBEK
Similarly, a divorce case held in Rumbek on  
26 November 2015 left a woman vulnerable to 
further violence. The woman brought the case 
for divorce because she had been subject to 
domestic violence. Yet the case was adjourned 
on the basis that family members needed to 
be present to authorise the separation under 
customary law (this is typically the case on the 
basis that divorce requires the return of the 
bridewealth). However, no measures were 
taken to protect the complainant in the  
interim period.  
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Are court judgements restorative? 
Customary courts clearly seek to restore relationships 
within and between families and communities, making 
efforts to reconcile the parties and to end future 
grievances, including through criticism and advice to 
perpetrators, and recognition of victims. Both statutory 
and customary courts employ compensation as a 
remedy. But compensation may not meet the spiritual 
and moral demands of the parties and might not serve 
reconciliatory aims. Moreover, both customary and 
statutory courts can apply significant punitive measures 
including imprisonment and fines. Almost all cases 
include a monetary fine and these can sometimes be of 
significant value, regardless of the economic status of 
the parties in the case. It is generally assumed that the 
families of the convicted person will assist them with the 
payment, but in the current context it is questionable 
whether such fines can be paid and whether unpayable 
debts might contribute to fuelling tensions rather than 
restoring relations. 
A MARITAL DISPUTE IN YAMBIO
The role of fines and punishments in even 
the most minor customary cases is apparent 
from this marital dispute in Yambio town B 
customary court on 14 June 2016. The case was 
brought by a 32-year-old Zande man against 
his wife. He complained that she had spent 
the night outside without informing him and 
did not respect him. The wife responded by 
admitting that she ‘escaped from him because 
he used to fight with me everyday’ and she 
went to Ezo county ‘to get rest’. Yet the 
ruling of the chiefs was strict and punitive. 
The wife was instructed to return immediately 
back to her husband’s home. Additionally, 
she was fined with 150 SSP or, if she could 
not pay, to serve a sentence of three months’ 
imprisonment. This case illustrates gender 
inequalities examined further below, but also 
demonstrates that customary courts are not 
simply ‘reconciliatory’ and regard punishment 
as integral to justice, including the restoration 
of relationships. 
Statutory courts do not tend to explicitly engage in 
public moralising about wrongdoing as part of efforts to 
mediate or reconcile parties. However, they do rely on 
customary norms that prioritise compensation as central 
to the resolution of a case. Compensation, including 
blood compensation for murder, is often presented as  
a punishment in statutory courts. While such decisions 
are closely informed by customary precedents, they  
may also be distorting some of its principles, due to  
the different processes involved, which do not involve 
similar deliberation on the case and which often lead  
to monetary settlements rather than cattle. 
A MURDER CASE IN RUMBEK
A murder case was held in the statutory court 
in Rumbek on 23 September 2015. The accused 
admitted to killing a fellow member of his clan 
with a stick when a fight broke out in a cattle 
camp. The deceased died of his injuries three 
days later. The accused claimed that he had not 
intended to kill the deceased. The complainant 
(father of the deceased) told the court that 
he and his family members had ‘opted for 
blood compensation as the accused is from 
the same clan.’ The judge ruled in favour of 
this, ruling the accused pay 8000 SSP in blood 
compensation and 2000 SSP in fines. He was 
not subjected to any prison sentence or other 
punitive measures. 
During the ruling the judge quoted part of 
the Penal Code in justification: ‘if the nearest 
relatives of the deceased opt for customary 
blood compensation, the Court may award 
it.’ However, he failed to note the remainder 
of Penal Code article 206 which stipulates 
that compensation is acceptable alongside 
imprisonment; it may be awarded: ‘in lieu 
of death sentence with imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding ten years.’8 This case 
illustrates the heavy reliance in the statutory 
system on a single judge’s ruling, and that 
8.  Penal Code Act 2008, Article 206, page 112.
judge’s interpretation and application of the 
law. It also demonstrates that even statutory 
law may be localised to sub-clan level, since 
the relationship between the complainant 
and accused was deemed material to the 
settlement. The social and political implications 
of killing a stranger have historically been 
considered to be different to those associated 
with the killing of a close family relative 
and the judgement appears to take this 
into account. This nuance is rarely captured 
in attempts to codify and harmonize the 
customary laws. This ruling also demonstrates 
a manipulation of existing law to fulfil local 
or family opinion relating to restoring and 
sustaining intra clan relations. However, in so 
doing, the law is contravened. 
THE PROSECUTION OF AN 
UNINTENTIONAL KILLING IN RUMBEK 
The award of Dia (blood compensation) 
remains a well-established principle in Dinka 
communities. But the scope for its reworking 
and application in diverse cases is apparent 
from a case in the same court in Rumbek on 
10 September 2015. In this instance, blood 
compensation was awarded as a remedy for 
unintentional killing by a Ugandan driver 
responsible for killing a 35-year-old man in a 
road accident. The driver had been imprisoned 
for three months awaiting trial and was 
ordered to pay blood compensation of 31 cows, 
on the basis that the act was unintentional (in 
the case of intentional killing the compensation 
would be 51 cows). The driver requested to pay 
a monetary settlement of 60,000 SSP instead, 
but was told that a single cow cost 3000, so he 
could pay 93,000 SSP, or the cows.  
While the price of compensation varies, we also see 
similar blood compensation settlements in various 
communities, for instance 24,000 SSP was awarded in 
one case in which a man was beaten to death in Torit. 
Meanwhile, 21,000 SSP was called for in another case 
in Juba, in which an Ethiopian man had accidentally run 
over an elderly man while driving – he had already served 
two years in prison but was detained again until he 
could pay. Such settlements demonstrate the continued 
resonance of customary norms – and especially that of 
compensation – across South Sudan’s legal systems. 
Do courts violate women’s rights?
Court decisions typically reproduce gender inequalities 
and contribute to securing the power of men over 
women, regardless of the variations in customary 
law and the rights accorded to women under South 
Sudan’s statutory law. As one court observer explained: 
‘customary law continues to give a man power over his 
wife and children’ (BKY, Juba, 2015). In large part, the 
inequalities and injustices arising in courts relate to the 
wider social and economic significance of bridewealth, 
which has increasingly been commercialised and binds 
women into subordinate relationships to spouses and 
parents. Gender relations and the meaning and functions 
of bridewealth have been negatively affected by decades 
of war (Jok, 2005) and the emergence of hyper-
masculinized, militarized identities (Hutchinson, 2000). 
Disputes related to bridewealth payments are typically 
addressed in customary courts. But the social norms 
established in customary law are carried through into 
cases of adultery, elopement and pregnancy that might 
be dealt with in either statutory or customary forums. 
Adultery is punishable by law and, especially when a 
married woman is involved, both men and women can 
expect to be harshly punished.9
Women bring cases to the courts, often to seek a divorce 
or to report domestic violence. But even if members 
of court panels may show sympathy for the woman’s 
situation, their primary consideration in decision-
making is the perspective of the relatives that ‘own’ the 
woman. Women are rarely questioned or consulted in 
cases concerning sex and pregnancy. Divorces tend not 
to be granted without the consent of the family (and 
repayment of bridewealth). Women are liable to lose 
custody of children. 
9.  It is worth noting that polygamy is legal for men. 
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A DIVORCE CASE IN JUBA
On 22 October 2015, a woman brought a case 
to the Kator customary court in Juba seeking 
to divorce her husband citing unfair treatment. 
She explained that she had always intended 
to get a good education and a job and had 
succeeded in securing a job in a ministry and 
had enrolled in school. However, her husband 
had stopped her from working by going to 
her boss to terminate her employment and 
stopped her furthering her studies. A panel of 
four chiefs publicly supported her entitlement 
to education but refused to grant a divorce, 
stating that this was a domestic issue to be 
resolved at family level with their parents.  
The court observer notes that: ‘in such 
customary courts, which base their judgment 
on the customs of the communities, there are 
mixed reactions. Those who received education 
(not all of them) believed the woman was right. 
Especially those aware of women’s rights and 
gender equality… But the majority of people in 
their communities believe in their traditions.’ 
A DIVORCE CASE INVOLVING A  
CHILD IN TORIT
However, Torit town customary C court on  
14 September 2015 did grant a divorce to a 
woman who claimed her husband had failed to 
provide for his family for six years. The couple 
had a five-year-old child. The husband denied the 
charges, explaining that he had been disabled 
by a sickness. But he agreed to the divorce on 
the condition that he was given custody of the 
child. He argued that he had paid 20 cows for 
bridewealth, and that in Lotuku culture he is 
allowed to claim his boy ‘by giving 12 cows 
and the balance of eight cows will be returned 
to him.’ A panel of five chiefs listened to both 
parties and ruled in favour of the wife, granting 
her a divorce, but also upheld the claim of the 
husband to the child, who was to be given to 
him at the age of seven. He was also told to 
support the boy for the next two years. The wife 
faced both the problem of repaying the eight 
cows for the dowry, and the payment of a 20 
SSP court fee, 100 SSP for the divorce certificate 
and a fine of 200 SSP in lieu of four months’ 
imprisonment (the reasons for this imprisonment 
or fine were not explained). This case highlights 
the possibilities for divorce and its potential costs, 
most notably the loss of the custody of the child. 
A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE IN TORIT
A case was brought to Torit town C court by the 
father of a woman who was suffering domestic 
violence. He explained that his daughter was 
being beaten by her husband. The accused 
denied the accusations and brought witnesses 
who attested to his innocence. No witnesses 
were presented by the complainant. The 
paramount chief ruled in favour of the accused 
based on the ‘evidence presented by the 
witnesses’. This case highlights how customary 
law often views women’s protection from 
sexual and gender-based violence as a purely 
domestic matter, and how knowledge of the 
system can sway a case outcome.
Women frequently bring cases to customary courts seeking a divorce or protection from domestic violence.  
However, unless they have the consent of their husbands or support from their families, they tend to  
lose the case. Such cases need urgent review in recognition of women’s rights. At the same time, this  
review needs to be sensitive to the complex dilemmas that chiefs face; chiefs courts are often the main 
authority that can stop cases of divorce erupting into physical violence. Occasionally, there are careful 
judgements that show customary courts can both protect women from abuse at home while also keeping 
peace in communities.
Art by Victor Ndula, for the Cartoon Movement.
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AN ACCUSATION OF ADULTERY  
IN JUBA POC
In a case held in PoC 3 in Juba a young woman 
was accused of adultery by her husband in 
an arranged marriage. However, the woman 
insisted that she did not commit adultery as she 
had not been consulted during the marriage 
arrangements and she referenced her ‘right 
to choose my husband.’ The court upheld 
that the girl had committed adultery with a 
man unknown to the family, a panel of 12 
chiefs sentenced the accused to six months’ 
imprisonment, 6500 SSP compensation to the 
complainant (arranged husband) and 2000 SSP in 
fines (payable to the court). The court observer 
reported that the spectators of the case (over 
100) were divided over the ruling with young 
people siding with the woman and her right 
to choose, while her husband and elders in the 
crowd applauded the upkeep of custom. This 
case highlights the heavy punishments imposed 
for adultery and how the understanding of 
rights, mostly learnt through rights education 
programmes of international agencies that 
solely target women, often cannot be actualised.  
Do courts bring perpetrators of sexual 
violence to account?
We can assume that many rape cases do not reach 
the court due to social stigma, the high potential 
for community violence and the potential effect on 
bridewealth. However, cases that do reach the court 
are often dealt with by bringing charges such as 
‘impregnation’ or ‘elopement’, which obscure the  
rape itself, or are dismissed due to lack of evidence. 
Technically rape cases should always be handled at a 
statutory level, however in several states the statutory 
court does not function, therefore the customary court is 
the only means to seek justice (also see SPLA case above). 
Courts rarely investigate whether sex is consensual, 
including where unmarried girls are involved. Rape and 
sexual violence are not only acute personal traumas for 
the women and girls concerned, but they are also volatile 
community issues partly because of their implications 
for the bridewealth economy. This leads both to failures 
to investigate in some cases, and categorisation of 
consensual sex as rape in others. The focus in cases 
concerning sex, pregnancy and marriage is instead upon 
restoring relations in order to stem tension and violence 
within and between families, or in the community. This is 
usually achieved through restoring bridewealth through 
(forced or early) marriage or payment of ‘damages’ to 
the family of the woman in question. Courts may be 
engaging in attempts to manage conflict, but rulings 
implicitly or explicitly conceive of women and girls as 
property and in so doing they reproduce the socio-cultural 
norms conducive to violence against women and girls. 
PROSECUTIONS FOR ‘IMPREGNATION’  
IN TORIT
A case presented in Torit town market court 
on 16 September 2015 was categorized 
under ‘impregnation’ and the young woman 
concerned was referred to as a ‘child’ and did 
not appear in court. The male youth accused 
was also described as ‘young’. Whether the sex 
resulting in pregnancy is consensual was not 
investigated, although it was noted that she 
was ‘taken from school to a house.’ The head 
chief (the only chief presiding over the case) 
ruled that the accused pay 1500 SSP as school 
fees and 1600 SSP as dowry for marriage. 
This case shows how potential assault can go 
uninvestigated while the focus remains upon 
the issue of how to maintain the girl’s value for 
bridewealth. The fact that the details of the 
relationship were not clarified and the ‘child’ 
was not present also raise serious concerns.  
Similarly, Torit C court on the 28 September 2015 also 
failed to investigate whether an ‘underage pregnancy’ 
case was a result of consensual sex. The accused (an 
adult male) is simply ordered to pay ‘damages’ to the 
father of the ‘girl.’ This exposes how the societal priority 
of maintaining relations among families, especially their 
elders, and the closely-related task of sustaining the 
bridewealth economy, both militate against investigation 
of a potential statutory rape case.
A STATUTORY RAPE CASE IN WAU
In contrast with the rulings against 
impregnation in Torit, a case held in Wau 
customary court on the 6 December 2015 
was categorised as a ‘statutory rape case.’ 
Yet in the description of the case the young 
man and woman concerned were described 
to have been in an ‘ongoing relationship’, 
suggesting consensual relations. The accused 
was imprisoned for six months and ordered to 
pay compensation of 6000 SSP to the relatives 
of the young woman.
FAILURES TO PROSECUTE ALLEGED 
RAPE CASES IN WAU
A rape case brought to the customary court 
in Wau in June 2015 concerned a young deaf 
girl. The mother of the girl claimed the accused 
was guilty of raping her daughter. The chief 
dismissed the case because a sign language 
interpreter was not available. The complainant 
strongly objected to this conclusion as when 
she previously brought the case it was sent 
back to be ‘handled at family level’. This case 
demonstrates how sexual assault cases are 
often dismissed as domestic or family matters 
rather than crimes. It also shows the courts are 
under resourced without provisions to support 
persons with disabilities to bring cases to court. 
On 10 August 2015, a case was brought to 
the police station in Wau. It concerned the 
statutory rape of a male minor by a male adult. 
The case was followed to the station by the 
court observer but never reached the court, 
despite the complainant having produced 
medical evidence. Seemingly, the case was not 
brought to the court due to public stigma and 
discrimination against victims of male rape.  
THE PROSECUTION OF AN OFFICIAL 
ACCUSED OF RAPE IN YEI
Given the wider context, it is essential to  
record and publicise prosecutions of rape.  
A case in point was held on 17 May 2016 in  
Yei High Court. The case was brought by a 
public prosecutor and tried by a single judge. 
No lawyers were present. However, it is notable 
that the judge took time to explore the details 
of the case and weigh up the evidence. The 
case was brought against a middle-aged man 
who was a government official. The public 
prosecutor recounted that the man was 
accused of rape of a young girl two months 
previously. He denied the act, but in a previous 
statement a witness had admitted to bringing 
the girl from the market place to the home 
of the accused, and leaving her there on the 
instructions of the accused. The government 
official accepted that he had given these 
instructions to his colleague, and that the girl 
was in his house, but he denied the rape. 
The victim was then asked to speak and she 
described that the accused ‘had sex with her’ 
and gave her money for her school fees.  
The judge demanded answers to why the 
accused had sex with such a young girl, and 
declared that he believed the victim and the 
witness statements and assured the court  
that the ‘law will take its course’. Finally, the 
judge ruled that the accused was guilty of  
rape under section 247 (Penal Code, 2008).  
He was convicted to six-years in prison with 
two years eligible for bail at 4000 SSP and four 
years without bail. He was also asked to pay 
compensation of 5000 SSP to the complainant 
and a transport refund of 1500 SSP. All parties 
accepted the ruling, although the prosecutor 
expressed his anger at threats he had received 
from friends of the accused when taking the 
case to court, and those present in the court 
‘complained about threats and behaviour  
of leaders.’ 
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Do courts increase the power of elders 
over youths?
Chiefs and judges are predominately elders and may be 
explicit about their concern to regulate the conduct of 
youth through the courts. Inter-generational tensions 
that surface in courts include disagreement over 
forced marriages of young women and, occasionally, 
young men. Customary courts also often hear cases 
of elopement where young men have tried to marry, 
despite being unable to meet the bride price obligations. 
Many customary laws in South Sudan demand a 
significant bride price, making marriage unaffordable  
for many young men. Older and wealthy men are in 
a much better position to marry, sometimes multiple 
wives. Indeed, political and military elites have sometimes 
employed payments of bride price to incentivise 
recruitment and secure loyalty, and to extend their 
patronage and kinship networks (Pinaud, 2014). 
Urbanisation, the shifting war economy, and the 
declining availability of cattle and money in some areas is 
challenging customary norms and the authority of elders 
over youth. For example, in the PoC sites some courts 
have allowed men to marry with a promise of future 
cattle. Elopements have also become a tactic to secure 
marriage or an expression of rebellion. Young men may 
elope without necessarily meaning to affront their own 
family or the family of their bride. If the family has cattle 
or wealth available for marriage, the bride price can 
later be enforced by the court. But some courts have 
imposed heavy sanctions on elopement, including prison 
sentences, going beyond customary laws that demand 
compensation for the girl’s parents. 
Cases related to sex before marriage and relationships 
between minors are very controversial, partly because 
of the threat these pose to the marriage prospects 
and bridewealth of the girl. Customary (and some 
statutory) courts tend to concentrate on demands for 
social reparation in such instances, while the questions 
of whether sexual relationships are taking place, or are 
consensual, are rarely investigated. Young men accused 
of such breaches of custom are subject to punitive 
measures, while their families share in an obligation to 
provide cattle as compensation, even when there is very 
little evidence to support allegations. 
YOUNG MEN SENTENCED FOR 
‘IMPREGNATION’ IN RUMBEK AND  
JUBA POC
A statutory case in Rumbek, involved a male 
youth accused of ‘impregnating’ a young 
woman. The woman in question neither spoke 
nor was spoken to throughout the case and the 
ruling and the issue of consent was not raised. 
The accused male was sentenced to two years’ 
imprisonment and a 1000 SSP fine.
A case held in the Juba PoC on the 22 February 
2016 demonstrates the focus on community 
relations at the expense of prosecution 
of a crime. A young man was accused of 
‘impregnating’ a young woman. The young 
woman in question was asked to confirm her 
pregnancy and was otherwise not consulted 
during the trial. A panel of 13 chiefs ruled that 
the accused should pay 4500 SSP plus 500 SSP 
for the ‘ronk’ (traditional coming of age skirt). 
However, the youth protested his innocence and 
raised the fact that no evidence or witnesses 
were produced. The courtroom started to 
become violent when the family of the young 
women in question heard his protestations.  
The young man was urged by the community to 
accept the charges brought against him and the 
chief’s ruling to avoid community violence.  
This case also highlights the role the courts play 
in stemming community level violence. 
Do courts resolve land disputes?
Judges and chiefs handle land cases cautiously and 
decisions are often postponed or prolonged while they 
call upon external authorities for advice, sources of 
legitimacy, or documentation. This unusual hesitancy 
occasionally produces good practice, but typically land 
disputes prove very difficult to resolve and complainants 
may bring the same case to court over a period of years, 
either in pursuit of a final judgement, or because a 
previous decision was not implemented. Land disputes 
tend to involve complicated and disputed paperwork, 
accusations of bribery and the use of force by people in 
positions of power or owning firearms.
A LONG RUNNING LAND DISPUTE  
IN JUBA
Land disputes are prominent and politicized 
in urban centres, especially in Juba. A land 
case presented to the statutory court in Juba 
on 21 February 2016 exemplifies the problem. 
The case was brought by a military officer but 
it involved a plot of land that had been the 
subject of various disputes over ownership. 
The accused claimed the land belonged to his 
father who was a prominent politician. He 
argued that his father won the plot in a court 
ruling against a military officer in 2004, but he 
could not present any written evidence of this.
In November 2005, the military officer in 
question came and destroyed the fence and 
erected a three-bedroom building in the plot. 
In 2011, the father of the accused opened a 
case against the officer and the court ruled 
in his favour: the army officer was evicted by 
force and his house was destroyed. In 2013, 
however, a different group entered the same 
plot illegally. A woman from Mundari ethnic 
group erected a few tukuls (huts) in the plot. 
When she was asked to leave, she said she 
was poor and needed some money to move. 
The father of the accused gave her 8000 SSP, 
but she used the money to build more tukuls. 
In November 2013, military police were sent 
to evict the woman from the plot, but her 
husband brought soldiers from his Dinka ethnic 
group that outnumbered the military police 
and chased them away.
When the civil war erupted in December 2013, 
the plot was abandoned. Then the father of 
the accused died in August 2014. Knowing 
the man had died, another military officer 
came to claim the plot; he opened a case in 
the High Court and won the plot. The accused 
employed a lawyer and appealed within 30 
days. However, the accused reported that both 
the complainant and judge were absent on 
every date set for the hearing. He believed 
this was a trick to allow the complainant to 
process documents for the plot, which he 
duly succeeded in doing on 18 January 2016. 
The judge confirmed the previous judgement 
in favour of the complainant. The accused 
remained convinced that the judges have 
been bribed or were biased since they failed 
to turn up and then ruled against him. He 
called for the ‘injustice that is being done by 
judges in favour of criminals who have money’ 
to be exposed.  
THE RESOLUTION OF A LAND DISPUTE  
IN RUMBEK
On 4 December 2015, a land dispute case was 
brought to Rumbek statutory court. The case 
had been in process since 2009. In the first 
hearing the court directed the Land Committee 
in the Community Land Authority and Ministry 
of Physical Infrastructure to inspect the land 
and make a fact-finding mission to determine 
the number of plots and their ownership,  
with respect to the two parties to the case.  
The committee found that the two had been 
living on the land since the 1970s. The land  
had three plots and the accused had one plot.  
The judge acted on the land committee’s 
report and divided the three plots as 
recommended. All parties agreed to the ruling. 
The accused called for the 
‘injustice that is being done  
by judges in favour of  
criminals who have money’  
to be exposed. 
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THE SETTLEMENT OF A LAND DISPUTE  
IN NIMULE 
A land dispute in Nimule was settled in a 
customary B court. The complainant was not 
occupying the plot. In 2013, he had planted his 
plot with bamboo and left it to be used later. 
In October 2015, the accused came and claimed 
the land, then sold it to another person for 
15000 SSP. When the complainant returned, he 
found the land occupied by the person who had 
bought it. He called for witnesses from the area 
who knew that the land belonged to him to 
explain to him what has happened. They then 
reported the name of the individual responsible 
for selling the land. The accused claimed that 
the land had been given to him by someone 
else before he sold it but he could not provide 
any proof of this since he said that person had 
since died. Members of the community then 
intervened in the case to confirm that the 
complainant was the owner of the land and no 
one gave it to the accused. The chiefs ruled in 
favour of the complainant. They charged the 
accused with responsibility and demanded he 
repay the person who had bought the land 
mistakenly and that he should leave the land 
within two weeks. The accused was also fined 
1000 SSP and court costs of 720 SSP. 
Do courts adapt to new circumstances 
and norms?
Courts are pivotal in that they often reflect social norms 
but may also contribute to changing them. This is 
especially relevant to customary courts, due to their flexible 
and participatory characteristics. There are examples of 
changes to the substantive content of customary laws as 
they respond to new circumstances and normative codes. 
There is also dynamism in the processes of selection and 
appointments of chiefs, and some chiefs have knowledge 
of other sources of law. There is latitude for chiefs to 
interpret law creatively, even when they premise the 
authority of the law on a notion of tradition and custom. 
In some cases, customary courts take progressive or novel 
decisions, even when they meet with the disapproval of 
a crowd that expects punitive measures. There are also 
indications that pressure from the crowd can influence 
decisions and evolutions in law. In some cases, members of 
the crowd show their disapproval of decisions that might 
affect them negatively. For instance, several observers 
noted divisions between youth and elders over decisions, 
and in Juba this divide appeared to be between participants 
who were more educated, and those with less education. 
A DIVORCE GRANTED IN JUBA POC
A young woman brought a divorce request to 
the customary court in Juba PoC3. She requested 
a divorce on grounds that she was ‘eloped’  
by the accused and forced into marriage.  
The accused objected to the claims stating he 
had paid 15 heads of cattle to the parents of 
the complainant so ‘the woman belongs to him.’ 
Witnesses attested to the marriage. The panel 
of 17 chiefs ruled that the complainant should 
be granted a divorce and marry the husband she 
had planned to. She was ordered to pay 4500 
SSP in compensation to the accused and 2000 
SSP fines to the court. The accused, witnesses 
and the attendees appealed the divorce 
decision. This case illustrates the courts’ ability 
to adapt to the woman’s right to choose, where 
she was physically taken and married against her 
will. However, this decision was reportedly not 
well received by some members of the crowd.  
Forced marriage affects both young men and 
young women, and may become more common 
with the collapsing economy and the reliance on 
bridewealth economy. Research shows that young 
men and women regard forced and early marriage 
as a primary form of gender based violence in their 
communities (Justice Africa, 2015). However, there 
are cases that show the courts taking a progressive 
attitude towards forced and early marriage. 
A YOUNG MAN RELEASED FROM A 
COMMITMENT TO MARRIAGE IN JUBA POC
On 6 June 2016, a young man was taken to 
court in Juba PoC3 by a man who accused him 
of failing to complete the payments for his 
sister’s dowry. However, the accused appealed 
that he was forced to marry the complainant’s 
sister against his will. The panel of 17 chiefs 
ruled in favour of the accused to terminate the 
marriage and that the accused received three 
cows in compensation. The complainant was 
also given one pregnant cow in compensation. 
However, there were appeals from some 
members of the crowd that the judgement 
should be overturned.
A DIVORCE GRANTED TO A WOMAN  
IN JUBA
On 20 December 2015, a middle-aged 
woman brought a case for divorce to the 
Kator customary court in Juba. She cited 
her husband’s alcoholism and neglect as her 
reasons. The panel of chiefs referred to the 
constitutional right of a woman to request 
a divorce. However, they deferred the final 
decision to her parents. The parents agreed, 
on the basis that they would receive access 
to their grandchildren. This case shows 
adaptive elements, in the sense that chiefs 
were concerned to uphold the constitutional 
rights of the woman. Yet it was also in line 
with a principle that matters of divorce and 
child custody concern the entire family, and 
especially the parents of the couple. 
A woman requested a divorce 
on grounds that she was forced 
into marriage. Her husband 
objected to the claims stating 
he had paid 15 heads of cattle 
to her parents so ‘the woman 
belongs to him.’ 
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Conclusion
South Sudan’s courts are striving to impose order at 
the local level during a time of war, disruption and 
atrocity. The practices and decisions of the courts, 
reflected in the JSRP court observation archive, expose 
the flaws of the justice system – its fragmentation, 
inequalities and abuses. And yet viewed in comparison 
to the wider militarization of politics and society, the 
courts still emerge as a source of legitimate civil public 
authority. The archive provides considerable evidence of 
the commitment of judicial practitioners to finding civil 
solutions to conflicts, crimes and social discord; and to 
invoking legal principles as the basis for their decisions. 
The courts draw variously and creatively upon a heritage 
of norms and practices associated with customary 
law, and upon legislation forged in the post-2005 era 
or under the new state of South Sudan. And in some 
respects the justice system appears to be working 
– various courts in different localities have brought 
authorities and violent perpetrators to account.
We find that there are both differences and some 
overlaps between the practices of customary and 
statutory courts and the versions of law that they 
employ, as well as variation within each of these arenas. 
Statutory court decisions generally depend on the 
interpretations of a single judge, since lawyers are rarely 
present, and the specifics of law and precedent are 
largely unclear or unknown to the parties. In contrast, 
customary courts processes are more transparent, 
accessible and locally accountable, partly because  
they involve several chiefs and public deliberation.  
Chiefs command legitimacy, and customary courts  
have been called upon to rule upon even the most 
serious criminal cases, and they sometimes draw  
upon statutory law to do so. 
The blending and improvisation that is apparent across 
the justice system produces numerous inconsistencies 
and serious injustices. However, cross-fertilisation and 
variation in decisions should not simply be dismissed 
as dysfunctional or targeted for wholesale reform from 
above. Instead there is a need for internal reflection and 
dialogue among chiefs and judges, and between them 
and local communities, regarding how justice can be 
advanced for all South Sudanese and how the legitimacy 
of the courts and law can be sustained. It is notable that 
the courts issue punishments, as well as making efforts 
to repair social relations. The principle of compensation 
is incorporated into both statutory and customary courts 
in cases such as murder, rape and adultery. However, 
the resort to monetary payments as well as cattle and 
the import of norms of compensation into statutory 
arenas, without the ethical and deliberative frameworks 
in which they originated, might erode their meaning and 
normative power. 
Certain norms, laws and judgements are directly 
implicated in human rights abuses or in fuelling conflict, 
and demand review. Despite significant initiatives to 
promote women’s rights and human rights before and 
since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) 
and South Sudan’s independence (2011), we find that 
the courts continue to violate these by prioritising 
considerations of parental or marital rights and concerns 
about intra-familial or communal conflict. The courts are 
reproducing societal norms that treat women and girls as 
property and increase their vulnerability to violence. 
Moreover, the costs of justice and the fines and 
sentences imposed differ substantially. There is a need 
for judicial practitioners to collectively reflect upon 
how to set fees and fines, and what might be fair and 
appropriate for payments, ranging from bridewealth to 
compensation. Additionally, in this time of desperation, 
there are some hints in the archive relating to concerns 
about corruption or bribery and strong tendencies 
for courts to rule in favour of the complainant in the 
absence of detailed investigations and evidence. There is 
therefore reason to be concerned that people bringing 
complaints might try to employ the courts to extract 
compensation, while there is scope for some judicial 
practitioners, especially chiefs, to increase fees and fines 
as forms of taxation during the crisis. 
As committed local advocates for justice, the South 
Sudanese team of JSRP researchers have demonstrated 
the merits of recording court cases to identify abuses on 
one hand, and exemplary or progressive rulings on the 
other. The cases discussed in this paper supply evidence 
that can inform future deliberations about how to 
transform justice from below. The paper also suggests 
that there are possibilities for such reforms.  
The customary system is central to justice in South  
Sudan, and, to retain legitimacy, chiefs are consistently 
involved in negotiating political, social and economic 
changes, social differences and social memories of 
custom. Meanwhile judges and lawyers are also adept  
at responding to diverse circumstances. 
As this paper shows, customary and statutory courts 
act locally, and conclusions about law need to be made 
cautiously with an awareness that its content is not 
fixed, and can evolve, including by setting precedents 
that may have influence on future decisions. There have 
always been plural, dynamic customary laws even within 
every ethnic group and fragmentation associated with 
the conflict fuels ambiguity over both the substantive 
content of laws and who has the authority over making 
and enforcing customary laws. Reformers need to be 
attentive to the reality that what is happening is not the 
formal codification of pre-existing static body of positive 
law, but an active, political process that will reshape 
ideas of justice and community.10 
10.  Given the divisive public reaction some rulings receive, it is 
important that not only judicial and legal practitioners but also 
community members recognise the law as fluid and adaptable. 
Plus, programming and policy formulation in relation to 
customary law needs to be aware of its potential intentional  
or incidental impact on the substantive content of law.
The courts need both support and ongoing scrutiny. 
Previous wars have seen the increasing militarization 
of justice: ‘military courts have supplanted local courts 
and military law has replaced customary law’ (Jok et al., 
2004: 28). This study finds that in the context of the 
post-December 2013 war, people have continued to 
bring all manner of disputes from very minor to serious 
cases to court in several localities, often independently 
of interventions by the police or security forces. Justice-
seeking and demonstrations of public compliance with 
the law indicate popular demand for civil order, while 
sustaining the public authority of chiefs and judges. 
But South Sudan’s courts are operating in very difficult 
circumstances and with limited resources. They are 
subject to pressures from above and below, and to 
financial and political incentives. Although the civil 
authority of courts has survived in some parts of South 
Sudan, it remains at high risk.
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Notes
Photo credits: Customary courts in various locations in South Sudan, taken by members of the JSRP research team, with 
special thanks to NP, AMA and GW.
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